# Some Motivations for Bayesian Statistics

If youâ€™ve been following my Twitter stream, you have probably seen that Iâ€™m doing some reading and study on Bayesian statistics lately. For a variety of reasons, I find the Bayesian model of statistics quite compelling and am hoping to be able to use it in some of my research.

Traditional statistics, encapsulating well-known methods such as t-tests, ANOVA, etc. are from the frequentist school of statistical thought. The basic idea of frequentist statistics is that the world is described by parameters that are *fixed* and *unknown*. These parameters can be all manner of things â€” the rotation rate of the earth, the average life span of a naked mole rat, or the average number of kittens in a litter of cats. It is rare that we can have access to the entire population of interest (e.g.Â all mature female cats) to be able to directly measure the parameter, so we estimate parameters by taking random samples from the population, computing some statistic over the sample, and using that as our estimate of the population parameter. Since these parameters are unknown, we do not know their exact values. Since they are *fixed*, however, we cannot discuss them in probabilistic terms. Probabilistic reasoning only applies to random variables, and parameters are not random â€” we just donâ€™t know what their values are. Probabilities, expected values, etc. are only meaningful in the context of the outcome of multiple repeated random experiments drawn from the population.

The Bayesian says, â€śWho cares?â€ť. Bayesian statistics applies probabilistic methods and reasoning directly to the parameters. This doesnâ€™t necessarily mean that the Bayesian thinks the world is really random, though. It turns out that we can use probabilities not only to express the chance that something will occur, but we can also use them to express the extent to which we believe something and the math all still works. So we can use the algebra of probabilities to quantify and describe how much we believe various propositions, such as â€śthe average number of kittens per litter is 47â€ť.

One of the fundamental differences, therefore, is that the frequentist can only apply probabilities to the act of repeating an experiment. The Bayesian can apply probabilities directly to their knowledge of the world. There are other important differences as well â€” frequentistic statistics is primarily concerned with testing and falsifying hypotheses, while Bayesian focuses more on determining which of several competing models or hypotheses is most likely to be true â€” but those differences play less of a role in what I find compelling about Bayesian statistics, and it is also possible to apply falsificationist principles in a Bayesian framework.